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Abstract: Anonymous communication networks like Tor
are vulnerable to attackers that control entry and exit
nodes. Such attackers can compromise the essential
anonymity and privacy properties of the network. In
this paper, we consider the path bias attack– where the
attacker induces a client to use compromised nodes and
thus links the client to their destination. We describe
an efficient scheme that detects such attacks in Tor by
collecting routing telemetry data from nodes in the net-
work. The data collection is differentially private and
thus does not reveal behaviour of individual users even
to nodes within the network. We show provable bounds
for the sample complexity of the scheme and describe
methods to make it resilient to introduction of false data
by the attacker to subvert the detection process. Simu-
lations based on real configurations of the Tor network
show that the method works accurately in practice.
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1 Introduction
Anonymity networks are designed to prevent a user’s
actions on the Internet from being visible to adver-
saries. Several networks for anonymity have been pro-
posed such as Loopix, Babel and JAP [6, 15, 30] with
Tor [11] being the most popular. These systems operate
by creating an overlay network on the Internet where
the route taken by a user’s traffic is randomized to dis-
sociate the origin of the traffic from its destination.
In systems such as Tor, certain nodes (relays) are
marked (using flags) for traffic ingress to the overlay,
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and others for traffic egress from the overlay to the in-
tended destination. In Tor, these are called guards and
exits respectively.
In these systems, an adversary with control of one
or more of these perimeter nodes is more likely to be
successful in a de-anonymization attack [21]. A partic-
ular form of attack on Tor and similar networks is sug-
gested by Borisov et al. [7] where the attacker induces
user traffic to take certain routes. For example, an at-
tacker controlling an entry node may be able to force a
client’s traffic to use an exit also controlled by the at-
tacker, and thus discover their activity. We call this a
path bias attack.
Monitoring the network to detect attacks is chal-
lenging due to the distributed nature of the Tor overlay
network, and its probabilistic routing. Further, in prac-
tice, all network nodes or clients may not trust the moni-
toring authority to protect sensitive information. There-
fore, network monitoring and attack detection has to be
performed while preserving the privacy of individuals.
Previous works on measurements on Tor [14, 16, 24]
have focused on characterizing the behaviors of clients
using the network. However, an attack or anomaly orig-
inating within the network infrastructure requires anal-
ysis of the behaviour of the network itself.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we propose a
scheme to detect path bias (PB) attacks and similar
anomalous behaviors in Tor. Our approach is to make
use of the middle nodes—nodes without the guard or
exit flags—to study the behavior of the network and
see if the traffic pattern shows deviation suggestive of
an attack. This deviation can be with respect to the con-
figuration of the network (as recorded in the consensus
document available in Tor), or with respect to expected
behavior based on historical data.
In this method, an aggregator collects data from
the distributed middle nodes to measure the behav-
ior of traffic passing from each entry node to differ-
ent exit nodes. We describe PB attacks in Section 4.
In this attack, an attacker with control of one or more
guard and exit nodes rejects circuits through its guard
node that do not pass through a compromised exit,
thus inducing a larger than expected volume of circuits
to pass through compromised exits, making them sus-
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ceptible to de-anonymization. Our main result shows
that PB attacks diverting significant amounts of traffic
can be detected—quickly and practically, with privacy
guarantees—from small amounts of data. In Section 5
we describe the basic statistical test for such detection.
To protect individual users, our system uses differ-
ential privacy in reporting data. Middle nodes add noise
to data before transmitting it to the aggregator, which
ensures differential privacy irrespective of the subse-
quent use of the data or the security of communication
channels. To prevent excessive noise in the system, a se-
cret sharing mechanism is used between middle nodes,
reducing the noise requirement, but also ensuring that
unprotected data is never transmitted.
The variable bandwidths of the nodes in the net-
work pose an additional challenge in privacy protection.
The bandwidths determine the probability of selection
of nodes in random routes. Therefore, very low band-
width nodes handle few routes, which reduces reliability
of statistical tests, particularly in the presence of differ-
entially private reporting. To preserve test reliability,
we introduce a binning technique, where nodes are pro-
cessed in groups. This approach makes the algorithm
resilient to low data volumes and noise due to differen-
tial privacy, but allows the attack to still be detected
efficiently. In a real system, an adversary can also con-
trol some middle nodes and attempt to subvert the de-
tection process by introducing false data. We describe
sampling and voting mechanisms to mitigate such at-
tempts. These enhancements are discussed in Section 6.
Our experiments (Section 7) rely on two forms of
data collected from the Tor system. First, we used a Tor
consensus document to generate random routes within
the network which represents an expected traffic profile.
Second, from Tor clients operated by us, we made a se-
quence of connection establishment requests to the Tor
network and stored the successful routes – giving us an
empirical traffic profile.
Experimental results on these datasets demonstrate
the performance of the outlier detection algorithm for
different types of attackers and show that outlier detec-
tion is accurate, obtaining high F1 scores in most sce-
narios, even with strong privacy requirements (ε = 0.1)
and using only half a day of circuit data.
Motivations. While we use Tor as our prototype sys-
tem, the use of randomized paths, attacks on them,
and statistical detection mechanisms are of wider in-
terest. Mix networks operate using multi-hop random-
ized routes and are subject to similar path manipula-
tion attacks. Random walk based anonymity measures
have been proposed in sensor networks, and also have
the risk of leaking information [32]. In IoT systems,
compromised devices can send information to adversar-
ial servers, which may be detected by statistical devia-
tions in traffic distribution. Thus we expect our detec-
tion techniques to be generally useful against attacks on
anonymity systems.
2 Background
This section presents a brief background on Tor, se-
cret sharing and differential privacy, along with related
works in Tor measurement studies.
2.1 Anonymous Communication Networks
and Tor
Anonymous communication networks depend on a
route-randomizing mechanism. Given a message or con-
nection c between source s and destination t, a random
route or circuit c is constructed so the pair (s, t) cannot
be identified with high confidence by an adversary.
The Tor network routes a connection along a path
consisting of three relays before reaching its destination.
The route is selected at the source, that is, by the client.
Along this route, nested encryption ensures that the first
(entry) relay only knows the source of the connection
and the next hop in the route. Relays with high uptime,
stability, and bandwidth are assigned the guard flag.
Only these guard relays may be used for entry into the
Tor network.
Let us denote the set of guard, middle and exit
relays as G,M and X respectively. The routes chosen
by the Tor routing mechanism are of the form (g,m, x)
where g ∈ G,m ∈M,x ∈ X.
The client selects a relay to be on the route of c
with probability proportional to its relative bandwidth
within its type. These bandwidths and probabilities are
public knowledge in the Tor consensus document pub-
lished every hour. An analysis of consensus documents
shows bandwidth distribution to be exponential, with
few large relays and many relays that have very small
bandwidth, and consequently a small probability of be-
ing chosen in a path. Indeed, hundreds of possible exit
relays have probability 10−6 or smaller of being chosen.
Privacy Preserving Detection of Path Bias Attacks in Tor 113
2.2 Additive Secret Sharing
Additive secret sharing can be used by a group of enti-
ties to collaboratively and securely compute the sum of
private inputs. We use this method for relays to share
the counts of circuits they observe. .
Suppose each relay M maintains a count C of the
number of circuits it sees. The relays wish to compute
the sum of these counters without revealing individual
values. For initialization, M randomly picks a secret
value xs modulo a large prime Q, and sets C = xs. It
then splits xs in toN secret shares by creatingN−1 ran-
dom values and setting xN = xs− (x1 +x2 + · · ·+xN−1)
mod Q. M then transmits the shares x1, . . . , xN to N
designated share keepers for future use. Each share
keeper adds the shares it receives from the relays to-
gether, modulo Q. During system operation, as each
observation is recorded, M increments the count as
C = (C + 1) mod Q.
When computing the sum over all nodes, we proceed
as follows: Each M and share keeper sends its value to
the aggregation server. Once all values have arrived, the
aggregator produces the aggregate as follows: It adds up
all of the values it receives from the relays to get R, and
separately adds up values it receives from share keepers
to get S, it then computes (R + S) mod Q to find the
sum of all observations across all M relays.
A compromise of up to N − 1 share keepers will not
reveal any information about the secret xs or any of the
intermediate sums to a dishonest relay, share keeper, or
aggregator. Like previous works, we assume that three
share keepers is reasonable for the settings we consider.
2.3 Differential Privacy
To prevent the data or statistics published by the ag-
gregator from revealing sensitive information, we use
differential privacy, which is the current gold standard
definition of statistical privacy.
Differential privacy operates by considering for each
input dataset D, similar neighboring datasets:
Definition 1 (Neighbouring Databases). Two
databases D and D′ are said to be neighbouring if
they differ in exactly one row.
Under this definition, differential privacy of a random-
ized algorithm requires that the probabilities of an out-
put are similar for any two neighboring datasets:
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy). A randomized al-
gorithm K operating on the database satisfies ε-
differential privacy if given any two neighbouring
databases D and D′ and a set of outputs S ⊆ Range(K)
then:
P [K(D) ∈ S] ≤ eεP [K(D′) ∈ S] (1)
Smaller values of ε imply stronger privacy.
Usually, differential privacy is achieved by adding
noise to variables in the database, or by adding noise to
the final aggregated result.
2.4 Related Work
2.4.1 Privacy and Network Measurement
Monitoring anonymity networks while preserving pri-
vacy for users is challenging [25]. The statistics available
at the Tor Metrics project [22] are indirect, limited in
scope and many are based on assumptions about net-
work usage. Early attempts at in-depth analysis [25],
were later considered to be risky for privacy [35].
In response, Elahi et al. [14] proposed PrivEx, ap-
plying differential privacy to privately collect and re-
lease statistics for traffic between exit relays and several
destination websites. They used a combination of secure
multi-party computation—or distributed decryption as
an alternative—and differential privacy.
PrivEx was later extended by Jansen et al. [16] into
the PrivCount mechanism, allowing for more statistics
to be privately collected (e.g. the number of unique
clients). Mani et al. [23] and Wails et al. [37] extended
the methods to be more robust to adversarial manip-
ulation of the statistics gathered, which was further
extended including a large measurement study in the
follow-on work by Mani et al. [24]. These methods focus
on collecting data on client usage of the system.
Our algorithm uses a similar setup, but for a differ-
ent objective of analyzing statistics of traffic within the
Tor network by collecting statistics from middle relays,
and leads to different privacy and utility guarantees.
2.4.2 Attacks and Measurements on Tor
There is significant evidence that adversaries who can
observe traffic at an entry and exit relay can re-
identify clients in low-latency mix networks such as
Tor [27, 29, 33, 38]. An attack was described by Borisov
et al. [7] which effectively denies service for routes which
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cannot be compromised, therefore increasing the chance
of a client using a route which is vulnerable to attack.
Singh et al. [34] describe eclipse attacks for overlay net-
works. Sun et al. [36] studied a new form of routing at-
tacks for anonymous communication networks based on
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) hijacking. Nithyanand
et al. [28] provide estimates of the potential widespread
nature of attacks compromising entry and exit relays,
finding that up to 40% of circuits created by the exist-
ing Tor client were at risk.
2.4.3 Path Selection and Network Design
Several works [1, 3, 13, 17, 28] discuss AS-aware path se-
lection methods, offering resistance against traffic anal-
ysis and correlation attacks. We propose a detection
scheme which can be implemented in parallel to these
methods. Recently, Leibowitz et al. [21] proposed a mix-
network design that detects and mitigates the effect of
malicious mixes in higher-latency networks.
3 Threat Model
The adversary’s goal is to opportunistically compromise
the privacy of as many clients as possible by compromis-
ing their circuits, and to simultaneously avoid detection.
Adversaries may be passive or active. A passive ad-
versary controls one or many guard and exit relays and
records the source and destination of circuits that pass
through both compromised guards and exits, but does
not attempt to manipulate circuits in any way. Such ad-
versaries are hard to detect, but are also less of a threat.
Our main concern is an active adversary, who tries
to modify the flow of circuits to capture more victims
than is possible passively. In Tor, an adversary can take
the following actions:
1. Drop and/or delay communication packets, includ-
ing Tor circuit establishment requests.
2. Control some fixed fraction of the total Tor network
bandwidth, by operating or controlling a fraction of
the guard and/or exit relays.
Let BWG and BWX be the total guard and exit band-
widths in the Tor network, and let BWĝ and BWx̂ be
the adversarial guard and exit bandwidths, then the ad-
versarial bandwidth fractions for guards and exits are




Since clients choose relays on their circuit propor-
tional to the relay bandwidths, the fraction of circuits
controlled by the adversary is determined by their band-
width. We assume that the cost of fielding this band-
width is proportional to its size. Therefore, compromis-
ing or deploying nodes with high bandwidth is corre-
spondingly more expensive.
The adversary is assumed to have full knowledge of
our detection scheme and may strategically:
1. Redistribute their available bandwidth between re-
lays, (Section 4.1).
2. Attack selectively to avoid detection by our scheme,
at the cost of lower compromised circuit yield, (see
Sections 5 and 6.3).
3. Control a limited fraction of data collection points
(middle relays) and may manipulate the inputs they
provide to thwart attack detection, (Section 6.3.1).
There is a trade-off between risk tolerance and success
probability for the adversary. A larger attack incurs a
greater risk of detection. We assume that the adversary
does not alter these priorities during an attack, in this
sense he is non-mobile.
There are two types of adversarial action in ques-
tion. The PB adversary executes the PB attack and
hopes to observe as much of client traffic as possible.
A non-PB adversary is an external observer that
attempts to use the statistical reports generated by our
scheme to infer client behaviour, possibly by cross ana-
lyzing it against other information.
4 The Path Bias Attack
Our scheme is designed to detect the PB attack, and is
resistant to an active, strategic, non-mobile adversary
who has knowledge of our algorithm and aims to avoid
detection while carrying out the PB attack.
In a PB attack, the adversary’s strategy is to sub-
vert the randomized mechanism and force a circuit c
to follow a route in the network with the adversary’s
compromised end-points. The active PB attack there-
fore allows the adversary to increase the number of com-
promised circuits in order to gain additional circuits in
addition to those possible through the passive attack.
Suppose the adversary operates a specific guard re-
lay ĝ and an exit relay x̂. While the adversary cannot ac-
tively dictate the route for a connection c to go through
x̂, they are free to selectively drop at ĝ any connection
that does not subsequently pass through x̂ [7]. The ad-
versary can use flow tagging, or watermarking, to mark
a flow with a sequence of packets (that do not inter-
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fere with the client’s traffic) that are detectable at their
controlled relays [31].
The attacker thus proceeds to perform path bias as
follows. For any connection c going out of ĝ, the at-
tacker observes if the traffic watermark matches one of
those arriving at x̂. If not, ĝ reports a failure of connec-
tion to sc forcing the client to retry. The attacker can
repeat this process until s selects (ĝ,m, x̂) with an arbi-
trary middle node m as the route for c. Once a circuit is
successfully diverted, the adversary may observe all the
traffic that flows through that circuit, recording the do-
mains, IP addresses, and any other traffic fingerprints.
The Tor network designers are aware of this attack
and have implemented a mitigation: each client keeps a
local circuit failure rate of its primary guard(s). If the
rate is too high, the client marks the guard as potentially
malicious. This mitigation is not turned on by default
due to its unknown efficacy. Even if this mitigation was
in use, its local nature allows a malicious guard to spread
the attack across all clients that connect through it,
albeit not as aggressively to avoid being flagged.
Our scheme addresses this by taking a global view
from which to detect path biasing attempts by guards
and attacks spread across a large population.
4.1 Effectiveness of PB attack
Let n be the total circuits created in the Tor network in
an epoch of length t. An adversary can then passively
(i.e. by obeying the protocol and not launching a PB
attack) expect to observe Eĝx̂ = n(Fĝ · Fx̂) circuits.
We now evaluate how effective the PB attack can be
in the Tor network and how the adversary may optimize
it. Using the PB attack the adversary can expect to
compromise up to
Eĝx̂,r = (n · Fĝ)(1− (1− Fx̂)r+1) (2)
circuits, where r is the number of path bias attempts on
any one circuit observed at the adversarial guard relay,
n ·Fĝ, in the epoch t. Note that r = 0 is the special case
above of the passive attack (no PB attack).
We observe two facts: 1) the adversary may compro-
mise at most n ·Fĝ circuits, and 2) as r grows the adver-
sary’s yield approaches n · Fĝ. Therefore, if r is allowed
to be very large (infinite and ignoring t for the moment),
the adversary may compromise up to n · (Fĝ + Fx̂) by
redistributing Fx̂ into Fĝ.1
Figure 1 shows that path biasing can allow an ad-
versary with 0.2% and 0.02% adversarial bandwidth to
compromise at most 4e5 and 4e4 circuits respectively
(the green and blue horizontal lines). The orange and
red curves show the compromised circuits as r is allowed
to increase. Note the long tails indicating that large r is
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Fig. 1. The number of circuits an adversary may compromise
when conducting a PB attack. The total number of circuits n =
2e6, with two adversaries, i) Fĝ+Fx̂ = 0.2 and ii) Fĝ+Fx̂ = 0.02
strategically distributed such that it maximizes the yield for a



































Fig. 2. The adversary’s gain when conducting a PB attack as
compared to the passive attack. The total number of circuits n =
2e6, with two adversaries, i) Fĝ+Fx̂ = 0.2 and ii) Fĝ+Fx̂ = 0.02
strategically distributed such that it maximizes the yield for a
given number of PB attempts, r.
1 For simplicity we assume here that the guard and exit pools
are of similar size and that Fĝ and Fx̂ can be exchanged at parity.
However, we can generalize the result above with an appropriate
exchange factor (z = BWX
BWG
) giving the total compromisable
circuits as n · Fĝ(1 + z).
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Figure 2, which captures the adversary’s relative
advantage, shows that a lower BW adversary gets rel-
atively more (200-fold, top red line) reward for their
bandwidth investment than the larger BW adversary
(20-fold, middle orange line). However, note that this
takes many more attempts (a larger r) than for the
larger BW adversary. Specifically, we see from Fig. 2
that the larger adversary (middle orange line) may com-
promise up to 50%2 of all the circuits that use its guard
relay with just r = 20 PB attack attempts per circuit
while the smaller adversary (top red line) requires more
than r = 201 PB attack attempts per circuit to achieve
the same compromise level. From the perspective of a
PB attack victim, the larger adversary still poses a big-
ger threat than a relatively smaller adversary.
In practical terms, if we assume that the PB at-
tack itself takes no time at all3, the circuit construction
phase itself still takes non-negligible time. Tor circuit
build times vary across the network.4 Assuming a typi-
cal figure of 250ms the smaller adversary would require
up to ≈ 50 s per circuit to compromise 50% of all cir-
cuits that use it, compared to the larger adversary who
requires up to ≈ 5 s per circuit to capture the same
50%. Therefore, in reality a large r may not be possi-
ble within the period t, either because 1) the adversary
may not be able to wait due to operational costs or 2)
the client may notice large delays in circuit construc-
tion and this could cause them to rotate away from the
malicious guard, ĝ, resulting in loss of potential circuits
to compromise. The strategic adversary will factor in
the above and chose the appropriate r to calculate the
optimal Fĝ : Fx̂ ratio before deploying their relays.
Practical limitations in attack strategies. In prac-
tice, in a Tor-like system, an adversary cannot gain sig-
nificant real advantage by using very low bandwidth ex-
its, which are selected with probability 10−6 or lower.
For example, this requires thousands of rejections by
the malicious guard before a client selects a low band-
width exit. While Tor does not have a clear guideline
on how many rejections marks a guard as defective, we
2 Similar results are obtained for other compromise proportions.
See A.4 for a summary table of results.
3 This is realistic since Rochet and Pereira’s dropmarking con-
firmation attack can be performed in the interval after circuit
construction and before any client traffic flows. [31]
4 Circuit build time statistics are reported on the Tor
Metrics portal here: https://metrics.torproject.org/onionperf-
buildtimes.html.
can safely assume that a practical client is unlikely to
accept this level of failure before changing guards.
On the other hand, the adversary may choose to
run many exits of low bandwidth, hoping to increase
the chances, but this will require deployment of hun-
dreds or more of new low bandwidth exits to have an
impact, which will be easily detected by Tor authorities
as suspicious behaviour.
5 PB Detection Scheme
Overview. Our proposal allows the defender to detect
when the observed number of circuits through a partic-
ular guard and exit pair exceeds the expected number
of circuits.
Formally, we operate with a sample dataset S, and
write n = |S|. The system is assumed to operate in
epochs, where each epoch produces such a dataset used
to detect presence of attacks. For any node a, we write
Sa and na for the set and number of circuits passing
through it. For any set of nodes a, b, c, . . . we corre-
spondingly write Sa,b,c,... and na,b,c,... for set and num-
ber of circuits common to all of them. The variable
Ea,b,c,... denotes the number of circuits through a, b, c
we expect to see in sample S based on prior knowledge
(such as probabilities for each node obtained from the
Tor consensus document).
Quantitatively, we wish to ensure that the number
of circuits through any pair gx of nodes does not sig-
nificantly exceed Egx—the expected number of paths
through g and x given the sample size n. Or, in general,
to ensure that the number of circuits nx through exit x
does not significantly exceed Ex for any guard g.
For this, we assume that the adversary, by employ-
ing the PB attack, intends to achieve nĝx̂ > Eĝx̂ +
(φEĝx̂ + λ). The (φEĝx̂ + λ) is the additional number
of victims that the adversary may gain by increasing
traffic through ĝx̂. The φEĝx̂ term implies at least a
constant fraction increase over the base rate Eĝx̂, and
the additive constant λ is to ensure that if Eĝx̂ is small,
i.e. the number of circuits through ĝx̂ is very small, the
adversary still gains some return for the attack.
On the other hand, the defender wishes to ensure
that E[ngx] ≤ Egx + (φEgx + λ) for every guard-exit
pair, and flags an attack if this condition is suspected
to be violated. The objective is to perform this test with
a given confidence 1− β, based on a data sample which
is subject to differential privacy.
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5.1 Basic Algorithm
In this section we will describe our basic approach. For
simplicity of exposition, we assume that the the adver-
sary controls a single guard and single exit node. More
general strategic adversaries are discussed in Section 6.
Basic algorithm. The scheme works in epochs. Each
epoch runs as follows:
1. At the start of the epoch, middle relays initialize
differential privacy noise and secret shares.
2. The middle relays count the number of times a
guard-exit pair (g, x) occurs among circuits passing
through it.
3. They send this data to the aggregator using secret
sharing to ensure security of the data.
4. The aggregator adds together the corresponding
counts from all middle relays, to get the total num-
ber of times the pair (g.x) occurred in the round.
5. The aggregator performs a statistical test to deter-
mine if the data shows evidence of attacks.
This process can be repeated for every exit for each
guard; so that in the end, for each guard, the aggre-
gator has a histogram with counts over all exits and
can perform the test for each. This model is shown in
Figure 3
Fig. 3. Output for the algorithm: a table of noisy frequency esti-
mates for guard-exit pairs.
For ease of explanation, we first describe the statis-
tical test, then we will describe the secret sharing and
noise addition mechanisms.
5.1.1 Statistical Test at the Aggregator
Suppose that the whole dataset is a collection of n cir-
cuits, and nx is the total number of circuits through
an exit x that has been reported to the aggregator by
middle relays.
Let us write Ex as the expected number of circuits
through x given n circuits overall. Under a significant at-
tack with parameters (φ, λ), suppose that the expected
number of circuits becomes Êx. Corresponding distri-
butions are shown in Figure 4. When there is no attack,
the observation is drawn from the green distribution
centered at Ex, while during an active attack, the ob-
servation is drawn from the red distribution centered at
Êx. The statistical test checks nx against the mid point
(Ex + Êx)/2, and returns:
– No Attack: If n ≤ (Ex + Êx)/2
– Attack: If n > (Ex + Êx)/2
In our setup, an adversary is looking for Êx to be at
least φEx+λ larger than Ex, thus the threshold becomes
Ex + φEx+λ2 .
Fig. 4. Observed frequency distributions for exit x with no attack
(centered around Ex) and with an attack defined by parameters
φ and λ (centered around Êx).
As more circuits are observed and the dataset
size grows, the distributions become more concentrated
around their respective means, thus reducing the chance
of false positives or false negatives. We formalize this
idea in the following lemma. For simplicity of notation,
we use n to be the relevant data size, nx to be the
number of circuits through an exit x, and p to be the
probability of any single circuit passing through x. Thus
Ex = np is the expected number of circuits through x.
Lemma 3. A sample size of





(min{1, (φ+ λEx )})
2
suffices to ensure that nx ≤ Ex+(φEx+λ)/2 with prob-
ability at least (1− β).
Proof. Here, nx is a sum of random variables, each of
which is true with a probability p. Thus, we can ap-
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Since this probability is to be bounded by β, we
have np4 (φ+ λ/Ex)
2/3 ≥ ln( 1β ).











≥ 1 domain, a different version of
Chernoff bound (Lemma 12) implies that n ≥ 12 ln( 1β ) ·
1
p(φ+ λEx )










(min{1, (φ+ λEx )})
2
samples suffice.
False positive rate (bounded by β). The direct con-
sequence of the lemma is to limit the false positive rate.
It implies that a small number of samples suffices to en-
sure a false positive rate bounded by β. Sample size n
increases only logarithmically with decreasing value of
β, and it increases at most linearly as 1φ2 . Observe that
1/p is the expected number of circuits needed to have
any connection through x at all.
False negative rate (bounded by β). A false negative
occurs when an attack is under way and the observation
is drawn from the distribution on the right (Fig. 4), but
the observation happens to be on the other side of the
threshold. By a variant of Chernoff bound [26] the same
sample complexity suffices as Lemma 6. Thus the false
negative rate of the algorithm is also bounded by β.
5.1.2 Differential Privacy and Secret Sharing
To protect the privacy of circuits counted by the middle
relays (e.g. from a non-PB adversary), each relay imple-
ments local differential privacy by adding noise to the
count before reporting it to the aggregator. The quan-
tity of noise required depends on a quantity called the
sensitivity of the model:
Definition 4 (Sensitivity[12]). The sensitivity of a




for all neighbouring databases D,D′.
Laplace mechanism of differential privacy. This
mechanism requires drawing a random number γ from






and scale ∆fε .
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In the case of counting, the presence or absence of a
single circuit can change the count by at most 1, and so
∆f = 1. Thus, a middle node samples a noise γ from a




. Instead of reporting
a true count C, the middle node now reports C + γ. It
repeats the process for every count reported.
The consequence of this method is that the prob-
abilities of reporting the same count are similar (to
within a factor of eε) whether a single particular circuit
is counted or not. The presence of a constant number
of circuits can be hidden by setting ∆f = k, and thus





. The parameter k is a
global constant for the system, set at initialization, and
known to all nodes.
The method of each data source (middle relay)
adding noise independently is called local differential
privacy. This approach has the advantage that it is inde-
pendent of the actions of the aggregator. By sanitising
data locally, the middle nodes ensure that the shared
information is permanently protected.
When added over a large number of source nodes,
the noise accumulates. The following result from Chan
et al. [9] gives a bound on the accumulated noise:
Lemma 5 (Sum of Independent Laplace Distributions).
Given γi as independent random variables following
Laplace distribution Lap(bi) with mean zero. Suppose
Y =
∑





i log(1/δ)) with probability at least 1− δ.
The bound, however, shows that we can only limit the
noise to a limited degree. For example, in a system con-
sisting of |M | data sources, and each adding an inde-
pendent noise from Lap(1/ε), the noise is only bounded
by O(1ε
√
|M | log 1δ ) with probability 1− δ. Thus, as the




Secret sharing. This noise accumulation can be





to the total sum instead of one to each variable. We
achieve this securely by employing additive secret shar-
ing among the relays and the aggregator (See Sec-
tion 2.2). In this design, the communication from each
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relay is secure, and the aggregator only sees the total of
the values from all the relays.
In a distributed setup, addition of a single random
number is achieved by each middle adding a smaller
noise to their value, which sums to sufficient noise.
When there are |M | middle relays, each should add


















before transmitting to the aggregator. It can be shown




















Fig. 5. Scheme design showing two of the phases where commu-
nication occurs. The red arrows denote shares.
Figure 5 shows the schematic view of the detection
scheme, which has three phases of operation: initializa-
tion, data collection, and reporting.
In the initialization phase, the data collectors (mid-
dle relays) initialize frequency counters for all guard-exit
pairs. These pairs are the same across all data collectors
and the same binning parameters (γ, η – to be intro-
duced in next section) are used for every middle relay.
Secret sharing is initialized as discussed earlier. A single
independent Laplace noise value, for differential privacy,
is drawn by each middle relay for each counter it stores.
In the data collection phase, the data collectors in-
crement the counter for each pair by 1 when a circuit
with that guard-exit bin pair is observed. The counter
is only incremented if some data travels via the circuit,
therefore the results cannot be skewed by an adversary
falsely creating many never-used circuits (see the fol-
lowing discussion for more details).
In the reporting phase, the data collectors send
stored frequencies (plus the Laplace noise) to the ag-
gregator. The share keepers combine the shares they
received from the data collectors, and send them to the
aggregator. The aggregator receives the shares from the
share keepers and the noisy frequency estimates, and
simply adds these to recover the original frequencies plus
Laplace noise. The aggregator then releases the private
frequency estimates.
After obtaining the noisy statistics, the end user
of this system (for example, Tor Metrics) can use the
results to identify presence of suspicious activity. The
detection is statistical in nature and does not provide
absolute guarantees. It is expected that the user will
perform additional investigations before taking action
against specific relays.
The enhancements described in Section 6.1 include
a strategy of grouping similar exits together to re-
duce noise, which improves attack detection, but cre-
ates greater uncertainty about the compromised relay.
Overall, our methods are thus not necessarily meant to
pin point the adversaries, but designed to generate first
alarms in case of attacks.
Discussions on Differential Privacy. If the number
of circuits to be protected is k, then instead of Lap(1ε )
noise, we add Lap(kε ) noise. In this scenario, the sample
size bounds (and thus the utility guarantees) can be
easily adjusted by simply increasing any terms in the
sample size bound containing ε by a factor of k. Elahi
et al. [14] suggest that for a collection period (epoch
length) of 1 hour, k = 6 is appropriate. If k + c circuits
were observed, the resulting value of ε would be εk+ck .
For example, when ε = 0.1, c = 1 and k = 6. Then, ε
increases from 0.1 to 0.117.
We suggest counting circuits after they have been
built and some data have been sent, for example, after
the RELAY_DATA cell is seen6. A circuit rejected before
this threshold does not affect the counts and therefore
does not affect the differential privacy guarantee.
An adversary aware of the protocol may choose to
wait until the threshold to discard the circuit, but this
incurs extra cost for the adversary. It would also in-
crease the overhead for the PB attack by both the size
of a RELAY_DATA cell (586Bytes), and the time it takes
to transmit, per circuit path bias attempt. Using the ex-
amples of the large (20% TBW) and small (2% TBW)
adversary from Section 4.1, the worst-case additional
bandwidth overheads are 11.7KB and 117.8KB respec-
tively per compromised circuit. The additional time
overheads are ≈ 1 s and ≈ 10 s respectively per compro-
6 Our scheme is not contingent on this condition, and can be
adapted to other thresholds.
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mised circuit. For a compromise rate of 50% of circuits
going through their guards, the larger adversary incurs
an additional BW cost of 2.34GB, and the smaller ad-
versary incurs an additional BW cost of 2.36GB.
Further, a behaviour of rejecting established and
counted circuits 7 in an attempt to carry out the PB
attack will inflate the count for the guard itself, and
can be detected by observing a larger n̂g, essentially
with the same statistical test as Lemma 6:
Observation 6. A sample size of





(min{1, (φ+ λEg )})
2
suffices to ensure that ng ≤ Eg + (φEg +λ)/2 with prob-
ability at least (1− β).
A large adversary performing this attack on a φ fraction
of its overall circuits, or a tiny adversary performing this
attack on λ circuits, will be detected by this test.
Composition Across Epochs. The composition of
T passes of an ε-differentially private algorithm over
a given database D results in a final privacy guaran-
tee of Tε [12]. Therefore, in the worst-case of a user’s
behaviour remaining identical across T epochs, the pri-
vacy guarantee for the user after T epochs degrades to
Tε. The epoch length can be increased to control this ef-
fect, with the downside of less frequent reporting. Given
that there is a significant cost and delay involved in be-
ing approved as a guard, monitoring in epochs of days
can be considered suitable for Tor.
Note that if users’ behaviour is different across
epochs, the databases used in each epoch would be dis-
joint and privacy degradation would be smaller.
5.3 Security
Our system design and communication protocols are
based on the secret-sharing variant of PrivEx [14], there-
fore the security analysis from there also applies here.
However, our algorithm uses different databases and
noise mechanisms. We provide discussions of the pri-
vacy and utility guarantees provided by our algorithm.
The worst-case vulnerabilities posed by malicious
relays, share keepers or aggregators are limited to sub-
verting the attack detection or denial of service attacks
7 In the event that the adversary is following an inefficient form
of the PB attack as compared to the one shown by Rochet and
Pereira.
on the algorithm operations. Both of these vulnerabil-
ities risk the normal operation of the detection algo-
rithm, but do not risk the safety of the network, or the
privacy of individual users – our scheme fails-safe. We
further address the risk of malicious middle relays mis-
reporting frequencies in Section 6.3.1.
6 Enhanced Detection Algorithm
In the Tor network, the bandwidths of nodes and there-
fore their probabilities of being selected in a path vary.
Some exit nodes have probability of 10−6 or smaller of
being chosen on a particular circuit, which raises a chal-
lenge in performing detection when the epoch length,
and therefore data volume, are bounded. In these real-
istic scenarios, low probability exits will have very small
number of circuits to report, which can be dominated
by the Laplace noise.
6.1 Binning Algorithm: Reporting Exits in
Groups
To decrease noise in the system, we take the strategy
of grouping multiple exit relays together into bins. A
single unit of noise then suffices per bin, leading to less
noise per relay.
We require the bins to have the following properties.
For a bin B, and x, y ∈ B:
Ex ≤ (1 + γ)Ey + η (4)
|B| ≤ m (5)
For given parameters γ, η ∈ R+,m ∈ Z+.
The binning is achieved simply by sequentially pro-
cessing exits in decreasing order of bandwidth and
adding to a bin until the addition will violate one of
the two conditions. See Algorithm 1 (Appendix A.3).
After running this algorithm, each middle has the
same set of bins and allocations of exits to those bins
(alternatively, the bins may be decided by the aggrega-
tor and reported to middle nodes). The middle nodes
now report counts for bins, that is total for counts of all
exits in a bins instead of counts for individual exits.
In the above strategy, m is a bound on the bin size.
Parameters γ and η are set to describe the maximum
possible difference in expected counts between exit re-
lays in a single bin, where γ is the multiplicative factor
and η is a small additive factor (e.g. 1e-5) allowing us
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to group together extremely small probability exits that
would otherwise require a large value of γ.
The binning based method does not by itself pin
point the compromised exit. Its purpose is to detect the
presence of an attack quickly using a small amount of
data, which can then be investigated further. As before,




noise. However, in this case this unit of noise is added
to the count in a bin instead of individual exits.
We now show that statistical testing based on bin-
ning is efficient.
6.1.1 Analysis of Binning Algorithm
For binning parameters γ, η,m as defined above, with
EB denoting the expected frequency of the bin B,
Theorem 7. A sample size of:










suffices to ensure that nB ≤ EB + 12 (φEx+λ) with prob-
ability at least 1− β.
See Appendix A.1 for the proof of Theorem 7. This re-
sult implies that the sample size increases only linearly
with the size of the bin m.
6.1.2 Analysis of Differentially Private Detection with
Binning
When we add Laplace noise to the counts in bins, the
required sample complexity does not increase beyond
small factors. As before, the results apply symmetrically
to bounds for false positive and false negative rates.


























suffices to ensure that nB + ζ ≤ EB + φEx + λ with
probability at least 1− β and ε-differential privacy.
See Appendix A.1 for the proof of Theorem 8. Note that
this theorem is for the goal of obfuscating the presence
of any single circuit. When the objective is to hide any
k circuits to the same level of privacy, the sample com-
plexity (or more precisely, the second term in expression
of n) grows by a factor of k.
Sample Sizes in practice. The Tor network con-
structs more than 1.2 billion circuits per day [24]. Con-
sider the case where β = 0.05 (a 95% confidence for
identified outliers), φ = 1, p = 0.01, m = 10, γ = 5,
η = 0.01 and ε = 0.1. In this case, a sample size of
n ≥ 275, 785 is sufficient. If the attack size decreases to
φ = 0.1 a sample size of n ≥ 26, 661, 792 is sufficient.
These theoretical estimates are loose, and are meant
to provide a conceptual bound that the data require-
ment does not grow excessively fast. Experimental re-
sults in Section 7 show that in practice substantially
smaller datasets produce reliable results.
An additional note here is that these theoretical re-
sults are with a view to reliably detecting a difference
in the circuit distribution, and thus the sample size is
required to be a multiple of 1/p, to ensure that there
are circuits through x for detection of attack. In prac-
tice, however, absence of circuits implies that there is
no significant attack action to detect.
Attack Parameters in practice. The values of φ and
λ are selected based on the characteristics of the at-
tacker and the desired trade-off between false positives
and false negatives.
Suppose that an adversary controls a 0.1 proportion
of both the total guard relay bandwidth and the total
exit relay bandwidth. As demonstrated by Figure 2, this
translates to an increase of between 1x and 20x times
more circuits observed through those compromised re-
lays, implying a level of φ between 1 and 20. The possi-
ble value of φ increases as the proportion of bandwidth
controlled decreases (Figure 2).
If Lap(kε ) noise is added, then λ = − ln(0.05)
k
ε is
the 95% confidence level for the increase in observations
due to this noise. Setting λ to this value or larger will
reduce the number of false positives due to the noise,
particularly for pairs where φEĝB is small.
6.2 Overhead Costs
Running the detection algorithm introduces some cost
for the relays, share keepers and aggregator. Suppose
the system comprises of |G| guard relays, |M | middle
relays (data collectors), |B| exit bins, |SK| share keepers
and a single aggregator. Let relay identifiers have at
most I characters. Let us consider a scenario in which
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|G| = 3000, |M | = 3000, |B| = 100, |SK| = 10 and I =
16. These values approximate typical numbers for Tor.
Database size. The size of the database determines the
basic communication and storage costs. The database
stores the count for |G|× |B| guard-bin pairs. Assuming
that each count is stored as a double precision floating
point number, each taking 8 Bytes to of space, which
for our scenario, amounts to a database size of 2.4MB
at each node.
Initialization Phase. During the intialization phase,
data collectors (middles) initialize storage for the |G| ×
|B| counters, and an database of size 2.4MB.
Each data collector sends the key information for
all the pairs (2.4MB) to the share keepers.
Data Collection Phase. During the data collection
phase, data collectors (middles) increment the appro-
priate counter by 1 each time a new circuit uses the
pair and has suitable traffic.
Reporting Phase. During the reporting phase, data
collectors (middles) report all frequencies, sending the
database of size 2.4MB to the aggregator. The aggrega-
tor receives a 2.4MB database from each middle relay,
as well as the shares from the share keepers.
Discussion of Overhead Costs: The communication
costs are constant, and small for any reasonable length
of epochs. In each epoch, a middle relay communicates
2.4MB for the detection algorithm, resulting in ≈ 7.2GB
for the whole network. Tor transports 517TiB of data
per day [24] (21.54TiB/hr). Thus the cost of the detec-
tion algorithm is negligible compared to the volume of
Tor client traffic, even for short epochs of one hour.
From the perspective of a single node, 2.4MB is
also a small cost. For example, in the consensus la-
belled 2019-09-04-18-00-00, approximately 95% of non-
exit-flagged relays (possible middle relays) have band-
width of above 0.01MB/s (40MB/hr), while 84% and
64% have bandwidths of above 0.1MB/s (360MB/hr)
and 1MB/s respectively.
The costs of initialising and incrementing counters
are also small. In 1000 trial runs on a 2.9GHz Intel
Core i7 processor, binning the exits (once per epoch)
takes 13ms on average. Initializing the frequency coun-
ters and random noise, takes 536ms. Incrementing a
counter when a new circuit is observed takes on average
0.45µs. For example, if 1 million circuits were observed,
the total time cost would be 450ms over the epoch.
6.3 Strategic Attacker and Practical
Considerations in Tor
It is natural to ask if instead of allocating its entire
bandwidth to single guard and exit nodes, the adver-
sary can gain any substantial benefit by dividing their
available bandwidth and running multiple relays.
To understand the effect of this strategy, let us con-
sider the attack parameters φ and λ separately. When
λ = 0 and φ > 0, the adversary can gain no benefit
by changing the distribution of bandwidths; this follows
simply by linearity. For example, if the adversary runs a
single exit x̂ with expected Ex̂ circuits, then they gain at
most φEx̂ additional circuits by the active attack with-
out being detected. If the adversary were to split the
the bandwidth into multiple exits, the total expected
circuits remains the same and thus the additional cir-
cuits remains the same at a factor of φ.
When λ > 0, the adversary can gain some advan-
tage. In this case, the adversary can direct λ addi-
tional circuits without detection to each bin containing
a compromised exit. For nodes with large bandwidth,
φEx >> λ, the approach does not gain significant bene-
fit over a passive attack. The approach becomes mean-
ingful only when λ is comparable to φEx. Since λ is a
small constant, the strategic adversary is restricted to
considering multiple low bandwidth exits.
In practice, low bandwidth exits are not particularly
strong attack tools since they are unlikely to be chosen
by the Tor path selection algorithm. An adversary may
insist on rejecting circuits many times to compromise
them, but simple calculations show that this will mean
rejecting a circuit hundreds of times before the compro-
mised exit is picked. Clients are likely to assume that
the guard is defective, and change to a different guard.
An adversary may choose to deploy multiple exits
in the hope of increasing their chances, but it is not
possible to stretch this far. For example, the current
Tor system has ≈ 1000 exits, and deploying hundreds of
new exits will be easily detected as suspicious behavior.
6.3.1 Sampling to Avoid Adversary Interference
Suppose an adversary controls a proportion q|M | of the
middle relays m̂ ∈M and attempts to subvert detection
by misreporting frequencies.
As a strategy to avoid this interference, the aggrega-
tor can sample a random subset of K middle relays from
M and then aggregate the observed frequencies from
only these relays. The probability of the result being
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with decreasing q and K. For example, if |M | = 1000,
q = 10 and K = 100, the probability of result being af-
fected by the adversary is reduced to 63%. If q = 5, the
probability reduces to 40%.
































circuits overall suffices to ensure that nB ≤ EB+φEx+λ
with probability at least 1 − β given that the aggregator
randomly selects K middle relays without replacement
from the set of |M | middle relays.
Lemma 9 describes the cost of this strategy, which is an
increase in the number of observations required (sample
size) by a factor of the reciprocal of the proportion of
network traffic observed by the sampled middle relays.
For example, if the sample of middle relays used to
report frequencies represents 50% of the total probabil-
ity mass over selecting middle relays, then the sample
size increases from n to 2n. See Appendix A.1 for the
proof of Lemma 9.
Choosing a large value of K which is likely to cover
a large fraction of the network reduces the basic sample
size, but the probability of the adversary affecting the
result increases as K becomes large. Therefore, there is
a natural trade-off here between protection against mis-
reporting and the increase in sample size required. The
exponential dependence on K suggests that sampling
alone results in a trade-off which could be further im-
proved, underlined by the relatively high revised prob-
abilities of the adversary affecting the result.
Despite this, sampling the middle nodes also has
the benefit of increasing the privacy of the algorithm, as
there is now a lower chance of any one group of circuits
being included in the result:
Observation 10. The subroutine of sampling has been
shown to increase the level of privacy obtained by an ε-
differentially private algorithm [2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 18]. As
outlined by Balle et al. [2], uniformly sampling K re-
lays from |M | without replacement would amplify the
ε-differentially private algorithm described, resulting in
a new value of ε′ = log
(




ple, if ε = 0.1,K = 100, |M | = 1000 the multiplicative
guarantee eε improves from 1.105 to 1.005.
6.3.2 Voting to Prevent Adversary Interference
An alternative approach to reduce the effect of the ad-
versary compromising up to q middle relays would be
for each middle relay to run the statistical test on its
own and submit the decision as a vote. The aggregator
may collect votes from K of the |M | middle relays, and
check the total against a threshold T . The aggregator
in this scheme works as follows:
1. Randomly select K from |M | middle relays.
2. Receive a binary vote (outlier or not) for each guard-
exit pair from each middle relay.
3. For each guard-exit pair, if the total number of pos-
itive votes exceeds a threshold T , identify that pair
as an outlier.
The defense provided by this method is to reduce the
influence of misreporting relays by collecting a vote, in-
stead of a potentially unbounded count, from each re-
lay. This strategy prevents a small number of compro-
mised relays from flipping the decision for any pair by
reporting a large value. It ensures a high probability of
correctly identifying an outlier pair despite the compro-
mised votes (Lemma 11).
Lemma 11. For up to q compromised relays, the prob-
ability of correctly identifying if a guard-exit bin pair is














given that each individual relay has a probability (1−β′)
of reporting the correct result for that pair.
See Appendix A.1 for the proof of Lemma 11. Note that
in order for an individual relay to have at least a (1−β′)
probability of reporting the correct result for a given
pair, they must individually satisfy the sample size re-
quirement. Therefore, similarly to sampling, the sam-
ple size bound must be scaled up by the reciprocal of
the individual’s proportion of network traffic, with β in
Lemma 9 replaced by β′.
Discussion of parameters. Increasing β′ increases
the probability of non-compromised relays voting incor-
rectly. Decreasing β′ increases the probability of correct
non-compromised votes, but also increases the size of
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the dataset required. Increasing the value of K increases
the probability that compromised relays will be included
by the aggregator. Decreasing K increases the relative
effect of including compromised votes. The severity of
this effect depends on the threshold T . Increasing T im-
plies that more positive votes are needed to identify a
pair as an outlier. T should be low enough to allow for
some errors by non-compromised relays, reducing the
required dataset size by allowing for a higher value of
β′. However, T should also be high enough to avoid com-
promised relays from easily overwhelming the votes of
non-compromised relays e.g. when T is close to K.
Using our previous example, if q = 10, |M | =
1000,K = 100, β′ = 0.1 and T = 50, the probabil-
ity of correctly identifying an outlier is 0.99. Doubling
the probability of incorrect non-compromised votes to
β′ = 0.2 changes the probability of correct identification
in this scenario to 0.95. Doubling the number of com-
promised relays to q = 20 results in a probability of 0.92.
Allowing T to be close to K with T = 95 (as advised
against), reduces the probability of correct detection to
0.68. The probability of correct detection approaches 1
as K increases.
7 Simulations
In this section we present experimental evidence demon-
strating the performance of the above algorithms for de-
tecting attacks on datasets of routes generated accord-
ing to the Tor process. The accuracy of the algorithm is
defined as its F1-score, which is a combined measure of
the false positive and false negative rates of detection.
The main observations are:
1. Attacks using high bandwidth relays can be de-
tected using a low amount of data (10 million cir-
cuits ≈ 10 minutes of traffic on Tor) when the pri-
vacy guarantee is strong (ε = 0.1). This is reflected
by an F1 score of over 0.99. (Section 7.4).
2. If all other parameters are held constant, increas-
ing the privacy guarantee from ε = 1 to ε = 0.1
causes a decrease in the F1 score from 0.99 to 0.84.
(Section 7.3).
3. This decrease in accuracy due to a higher level of
noise can be offset by increasing λ as ε decreases.
In this case, even for ε = 0.1 an F1 score of 0.98 is
attained. (Section 7.3).
4. Attacks which are spread out between many low
bandwidth exit relays are harder to detect. How-
ever, increasing the dataset size recovers the lost ac-
curacy, resulting in F1 scores of over 0.99, as long as
the guard relay is either high bandwidth or medium
bandwidth. (Section 7.4).
5. Attacks using many low bandwidth guards are the
most difficult to detect, with F1 scores of between
0.79 and 0.88. (Section 7.5).
See Section 7.2 for a full explanation of the terms used.
7.1 Data Sets
Two datasets were used in the completion of these ex-
periments.The first dataset (RW-Tor) captures a total
of 353, 331 successful circuits generated via Tor clients
from four different regions: Canada(Central, 86, 740 cir-
cuits), Frankfurt(Europe, 96, 072 circuits), Oregon(US-
West, 91, 397 circuits), and Tokyo(Asia, 79, 122 circuits).
Our clients selected routes using the latest version of the
Tor routing mechanism. See Appendix A.2 for details of
the collection procedure. Due to the large cost of gener-
ating the RW-Tor data set, a second data set (SYN-Tor)
was synthetically generated containing 1 billion circuits
(around a day of traffic across the Tor network [24])
by outputting routes with a distribution matching the
relay selection probabilities described by the Tor con-
sensus document labeled 2019-09-04-18-00-00.
Comparing Synthetic to Real World Tor Circuit
Data. Our expected number of circuits observed at a
node comes from the consensus documents generated by
the Tor network every hour. However, the actual circuits
that clients build depend on 1) the Tor path selection
algorithm that introduces additional rules for security
and performance reasons, 2) transient network effects,
and 3) path skews due to client location on the net-
work [19]. We use our RW-Tor dataset for this analysis.
Due to our limited sample size, we analyze the top
10 guard-exit pairs since we can be more confident
(β = 0.05) at this end of the range. Our results show
that these pairs are more frequently selected than is ex-
pected, on average 1.96 times more often (σ2 = 0.753).
This may be for the reasons we have already mentioned
above. To accommodate these phenomena, our scheme
can be tuned with this in mind by setting φ = 0.96, in
this case. With a larger sample size we could better tune
the scheme by analysing the network deviation across all
guard-exit pairs and updating the expected probability
distributions and scheme parameters accordingly.
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7.2 Simulation Set-Up (SYN-Tor)
The ability of the algorithm to detect an attack depends
on factors including the amount of data (n), the ex-
pected probability of the compromised relay (p), the
attack size (φ, λ) and the privacy level (ε). In order to
explore the relationships between these interacting fac-
tors, we defined several dataset sizes of between 2 mil-
lion and 1 billion circuits and examined the accuracy
of the algorithm for various attack scenarios. Follow-
ing [14], we let k = 6, our results then obscure changes
of up to 6 circuits per epoch.
The attack scenarios are defined by the ‘size’ of the
relays being compromised (p) and the magnitude of the
attack (i.e. the probability pA that a route through a
compromised guard will be rejected).
We consider two types of simulated adversary:
1. A high resource adversary who has the resources
available to run both a single compromised high
bandwidth guard and high bandwidth exit for the
desired amount of time. These relays have a ≈
3×10−3 proportion of the total available guard/exit
bandwidth.
2. A medium resource adversary who has the re-
sources available to run both a single compromised
medium bandwidth guard and medium bandwidth
exit for the desired amount of time. These relays
have a ≈ 1 × 10−4 to 1 × 10−5 proportion of the
total bandwidth
A low bandwidth relay has p < 1 × 10−6. Note that
the adversary can divide resources into multiple lower
bandwidth relays in each of the two cases above. For
example, a high resource adversary could compromise
approximately 10 medium bandwidth guard/exit relays.
In each scenario, the attacks were simulated by se-
lecting compromised relays of the appropriate expected
frequencies and then, with probability pA = 0.1, remov-
ing routes generated which contained a compromised
guard relay but did not pass through a compromised
exit relay. These routes were replaced with routes pass-
ing through the compromised exit relay. The appropri-
ate expected frequencies were those described by the
Consensus labeled 2019-09-04-18-00-00.
7.3 The Effect of ε
We first examine the effect which the level of privacy
guarantee has on accuracy. As shown in Figure 6, when
all other parameters are held constant, increasing the
strength of the privacy guarantee reduces accuracy due
to the addition of a larger amount of random noise. For
example, using a dataset of 50 million circuits letting
ε = 0.1 results in an F1 score of 0.84 whereas ε = 1
produces an F1 score of 0.99. Figure 6 demonstrates
that for low values of ε such as 0.1, the F1 score can be
improved by increasing the dataset size. In this case, for
ε = 0.1, the F1 score increases to 0.87 if the dataset size
increases to 1 billion circuits (∼1 day of traffic).
Larger improvements can be made by allowing λ to
increase as ε decreases to reflect the larger magnitude
of noise added. Figure 6 demonstrates that the loss in
accuracy is significantly reduced, with all F1 scores be-
tween 0.977 and 0.99, if we allow λ = − ln(0.05)6ε in or-
der to reflect the 95% confidence interval for the Laplace
distribution with scale 6ε .
7.4 Detecting Different Attack Scenarios
In this section, scenarios including those which spread
the attacks in this way are considered.
High Resource Adversary. Suppose we define high,
medium and low bandwidth relays as before. A high re-
source adversary could then use any combination of a
single high bandwidth guard, some medium bandwidth
guards (i.e. 10) or many (i.e. 100) low bandwidth guards
with a single high bandwidth exit, some medium band-
width exits or many low bandwidth exits.
As shown in Table 1, detection quickly reaches an
F1 score of 1 using any combination of high and medium
bandwidth relays.
Datasize (mil.)
10 50 100 200 500 1000
High BW Guard
High BW Exit 0.99 1 1 1 1 1
Medium BW Exits 0.99 0.99 1 1 1 1
Low BW Exits .76 .98 .99 .99 1 1
Medium BW Guards
High BW Exit .99 .99 1 1 1 1
Medium BW Exits .92 .99 1 1 1 1
Low BW Exits .67 .69 0.79 0.92 0.99 1
Low BW Guards
High BW Exit 0.65 0.70 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.82
Medium BW Exits 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.72 0.74
Low BW Exits 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
Table 1. F1 Score vs datasize with ε = 0.1, φ = 10, λ = 150.
Attacks using low bandwidth exit relays with high
or medium bandwidth guard relays also reach an F1
score of 1 when the dataset size is increased to ap-
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Fig. 6. High bandwidth guard and exit pairs, using φ = 10, λ = 20 and φ = 10, λ = − ln(0.05) 6
ε
respectively.
proximately 1 hour of data for a single high bandwidth
guard, and 1 day of traffic using some medium band-
width guards.
The same is not true of attacks using many low
bandwidth guards. However, as discussed further in Sec-
tion 7.5, calibrating binning parameters of the algorithm
more carefully leads to significant improvements in the
performance of the algorithm in this scenario.
Medium Resource Adversary. According to our def-
inition of a medium resource adversary, this type of ad-
versary could use any combination of a single medium
bandwidth guard relay or some (i.e. 10) low bandwidth
guard relays with a single medium bandwidth exit relay
or some low bandwidth exit relays.
Table 3 (Appendix A.5) demonstrates that the con-
clusions in the medium resource adversary scenario are
similar to those of the high resource adversary scenario.
7.5 Binning Strategy for Low Bandwidth
Guards
The algorithm’s performance when the adversary uses
low bandwidth guards can be improved by altering the
generic parameter settings used above to increase the
number of exit relays per bin. This is done by increasing
the maximum number of relays per bin fromm = 20 and
η = 1× 10−6, to m = 100 and η = 1× 10−5.
The maximum F1 scores attained for the high re-
source adversary case with multiple low bandwidth
guards were originally 0.82, 0.74 and 0.66 (Table 1).
The revised binning strategy improved these to 0.86,
0.84 and 0.80 respectively (Table 4, Appendix A.5). In
the medium adversary case, the maximum attained F1
scores improved from 0.86 and 0.61 (Table 3) to 0.88
and 0.79 (Table 4).
8 Conclusion
Path manipulation attacks can compromise various
anonymity systems. We presented a statistical frame-
work for detecting such attacks with rigorous guarantees
for Tor. We have shown that the accuracy of the detec-
tion improves rapidly with available data as well as with
scale of attacks. Thus, as the popularity of such systems
grows, or adversaries gain more powerful nodes and at-
tacks become more dangerous, the detection mechanism
becomes more effective. We also expect our approach to
be useful in other anonymous communication systems
such as mix networks and for securing IoT networks.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of theoretical results
Lemma 12. Let X denote the sum of n independent
random variables, X1, ...Xn, where µ = E[X]. Then, for
δ ≥ 1,
P [X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ e−
δµ
3 (6)
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Proof of Theorem 7:
Proof. We can split n into n = n1 + n2 where:
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assuming that n1 > 1p . This implies:
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> 1 this implies by Lemma 12, that
P [nB ≥ EB +
1







Proof of Theorem 8:


























The following result then follows in the same way as
Theorem 7, substituting φ with φ2 and β with
β
2 . A
sample size of n1 ensures that
P [nB ≤ EB +
1
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− 14 (φEx+λ)ε ≤ β2 .
Since ζ ∼ Lap(0, 1ε ) this implies:
P [ζ ≥ 14(φEx + λ)] ≤
β
2 .
Therefore, as n ≥ n1 and n ≥ n2:
P [nB + ζ ≥ EB +
1





Proof of Lemma 9:
Proof. Middle relaysm1, ...mK receive a proportion α =∑
i∈{1,...,K} pmi of the total network traffic.
The result describing the sample size in Theorem 8
still holds in this case, however now if no circuits are
observed by the network, only αno are expected to be
recorded by the sampled middle relays.
Therefore the result found in Theorem 8 increases




Proof of Lemma 11:
Proof. Say V =
∑
i=1,...,K vi where vi is a binary vote
from middle relay i indicating if a given pair is an outlier
or not an outlier.
If the pair is an outlier, the expected value of K
reported votes is (1 − β′)K. This is correctly identified
when q votes are misreported if V ≥ T + q. By Chernoff
Bound:
P (V ≤ (1 + α)(1− β′)K) ≤ e−
α2(1−β′)K
2+α
Setting (1 + α)(1 − β′)K = T + q we obtain the
required bound:














A.2 Further Experimental Details for
RW-Tor
Our approach was to run 120 Tor clients (30 in each
of the four regions) in parallel, one per virtual machine
deployed on Amazon Web Services, and construct and
record successful circuits over the course of one hour.
This process was approved by the Tor research safety
board and our University ethics board.
We utilized Tor version 4.0.5 (May 2, 2019) which
we built from source. Our circuit collection script in-
teracted with the running Tor client through the Tor
controller port using the STEM library. We constructed
circuits as follows:
1. We allow Tor to start up
2. We download the consensus through STEM and
save it for future reference.
3. We drop the guards the client knows about so far,
thus forcing the Tor client to re-pick a guard(s) for
future circuit creation requests.
4. We create 1 circuit, logging each successful circuit
(i.e. three hops) built. The next circuit is requested
after the we log the previous one.
5. We repeat the last two steps 3600 times.
6. Finally we download the consensus again and store
it for future reference before ending the experiment.
Our 120 Tor clients attempted to construct 378943 cir-
cuits. However, in reality circuits do not always build
successfully (i.e. circuits of length less than three) within
the 1 second between the circuit creation request and
the logging. Removing those we captured 353331 cir-
cuits (1-2pm on 20/05/2020).
Circuits were created using Stem; specifically, the
via the module Controller. Note that our torrc configu-
ration uses the default settings, except that we open
a control port (un-commenting the line ControlPort
9051 ). We observed that the percentage of failed cir-
cuits was ≈ 6.7% on average across all the regions.
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A.3 Binning Algorithm PseudoCode
Data: Data size n, probabilities of exits.
Parameters γ, η, m
Result: Result a histogram of counts in bins.
S=sorted(x ∈ X) (exits descending order) ;
k=0 (bin number);
for s ∈ S in descending order do
if (∃x ∈ Bk : Ex ≥ (1 + γ)Es + η) or
|Bk| ≥ m then
k = k + 1 (move to next bin);
Bk = Bk ∪ {s} (initialize with the
current element);
else
Bk = Bk ∪ {s} (add to current bin)
end
end
Algorithm 1: Binning algorithm
A.4 PBA under various compromise rates
Retries per circuit, r
10% 20% 50%
pb-0.02 29 56 201
pb-0.2 2 4 20
Table 2. Number of retries per circuit, r, required to compro-




10 50 100 200 500 1000
Medium BW Guard
Medium BW Exit 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Low BW Exits 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.98 0.99
Low BW Guards
Medium BW Exit 0.67 0.73 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.86
Low BW Exits 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61
Table 3. F1 Score vs datasize with ε = 0.1, φ = 10, λ = 150.
Datasize (mil.)
10 50 100 200 500 1000
High Resource Adversary - Low BW Guards
High BW Exit 0.66 0.76 0.80 0.83 0.84 0.86
Medium BW Exits 0.66 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.84
Low BW Exits 0.65 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.77 0.80
Medium Resource Adversary - Low BW Guards
Medium BW Exit 0.66 0.78 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.88
Low BW Exits 0.63 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.76 0.79
Table 4. F1 Score vs datasize with ε = 0.1, φ = 10, λ = 150.
